Credibility and its Attacks

International audienceThis paper presents a new notion of credibility and attacks on credibility that are relevant to conversations with opposed interlocutor preferences. We offer a semantics for dialogue turns and commitments that allows for arbitrary nestings of commitments. We show that this complexity is required to analyze many examples of attacks on credibility

Modelling Strategic Conversation: model, annotation design and corpus

International audienceA Gricean view of cognitive agents holds that agents are fully rational and adhere to the maxims of conversation that entail that speakers adopt shared intentions and fully aligned preferences–e.g. (Allen and Litman, 1987; Lochbaum, 1998). These assumptions are unwarranted in many conversational settings. In this paper we propose a different view and an annotation scheme for it

Logique dynamique pour le raisonnement stratégique dans les jeux extensifs

This paper continues the dynamic modal logic analysis provided by van Benthem [5] of procedural rationality in games. Specifically we look at extensive games, and use preference logic to provide a closer analysis of backward induction type algorithms. This results in distinguishing two kinds of rationality : decision rationality and preference rationality. To these two kinds of rationality correspond game transformations, for which we give syntactic counterparts in a modal logic. In the final model arrived at through transformations of a nongeneric game, there can be paths which are in no subgame-perfect equilibrium. More generally the nature of solutions that our approach can induce is incompatible with the retrospective nature of the usual concepts of game theory. We end the paper with some remarks on potential uses of such a modal logic analysis to the cases of imperfect information or where rationality is bounded